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590 PEOPLE V. TARANTINO [45 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 5705. In Bank. Nov. 28, 1955.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JAMES TARANTINO, 
Appellant. 
[1] Searches and Seizures-Use of Dictographs.-Pen. Code, 
§ 653h, providing that "nothing herein shall prevent the use 
and installation of dictographs" by peace officers in certain 
cases, does not and cannot authorize violations of constitu-
tional provisions relating to search and seizure. 
[2] Id.-Use of Dictographs.-Installations of dictographs by po-
lice officers that violate the constitutional provisions relating to 
search and seizure cannot be made lawful by authorization of 
the head of the police department or the district attorney; 
such provisions protect the people from unreasonable invasions 
of their privacy by the police, and the determination of what 
is reasonable cannot be left to the police. 
[3] Id.-What Constitutes Violation of Constitutional Guaranties. 
-A lawless search and seizure by a private person acting 
in a private capacity is not a violation by a state or federal 
agency of constitutional guaranties. 
[4] Id.-What Constitutes Violation of Constitutional Guaranties. 
-An engineer's installation of a microphone in defendant's 
room as an agent of the district attorney and the police de-
partment, while working under direct supervision of an in-
spector of police and being paid with public funds, and clan-
destine eavesdropping by the police, violate the constitutional 
provisions relating to search and seizure. 
[5] Extortion- Appeal- Reversible Error- Evidence.-The ad-
mission of illegally obtained recordings from a microphone 
secretly installed in defendant's room resulted in a mis-
carriage of justice in an extortion case necessitating a new 
trial as to the counts based on occurrences subsequent to the 
installation of such microphone, where the recordings con-
tained evidence immediately and directly tending to prove the 
charged offenses, such as the names of the complaining wit-
nesses and defendant's remarks connecting these witnesses 
with threats and demands for money. 
[6] Id.-Evidence.-A conviction of extortion on a count based 
on an act occurring before a microphone was secretly and un-
[1] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [5] 
Extortion, § 10; [6, 10, 11] Extortion, § 8; [7] Criminal Law, 
§ 1285(1); [8, 9] Criminal Law,§ 525.5; [12] Witnesses, § 135(4); 
[13] Criminal Law, § 349. 
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lawfully installed in defendant's room is sustained, independ-
ently ~f any evidence obtained by use of such microphone, 
by the victim's testimony that defendant demanded and re-
ceived money from him under a threat to "blast" him on a 
radio program if he did not pay, and by the testimony of other 
victims of extortions showing the pattern of defendant's crim-
inal operations. 
[7] Criminal Law-Appeal-Presumptions-Jury-Following In-
structions.-Where the jury in an extortion case were in-
structed that each count set forth in the indictment charged 
a separate and distinct offense and that they must state their 
findings as to each count in a separate verdict uninfluenced 
by the mere fact that their verdict as to any other count was 
for or against defendants, it must be presumed that the jury 
obeyed such instruction and were not influenced to return a 
guilty verdict as to one count on evidence other than that 
pertinent to such count. 
[ 8] !d.-Evidence-Sound Recordation.-Defendant may not suc-
cessfully urge that he was denied a reasonable opportunity 
to hear and decipher illegally obtained sound recordings be-
fore or after excerpts therefrom were received in evidence, 
where defense counsel were offered and did not avail them-
selves of opportunities to hear the recordings. 
[9] !d.-Evidence-Sound Recordation.-Defendant may not suc-
cessfully urge that the court should have granted his requests 
for copies of transcriptions, prepared by the prosecution, of 
those portions of sound recordings of his conversations which 
were not introduced in evidence where he does not suggest what 
useful purpose would have been served by his counsel's hearing 
the recordings or reading the transcriptions, and where he 
does not suggest that they contained anything relevant to 
the case. 
[10] Extortion-Evidence.-Evidence tending to show extortions 
and attempted extortions other than those charged is ad-
missible where it tends to show criminal methods and purposes 
similar to those shown by the victim's testimony. 
[11] Id.-Evidence.-In an extortion case it was proper to admit 
in evidence issues of defendant's magazine which were found 
in his room at the time of his arrest, where the magazine was 
shown by other evidence to have been an instrumentality 
by which defendant carried out his threats to "blast" his 
victims, and where the victims were "told" to advertise in the 
magazine. 
[12] Witnesses - Cross-examination - Scope and Extent.-Where 
defendant on direct examination testified in effect that he 
did not commit the extortions charged, the prosecution prop-
erly cross-examined him as to other, similar offenses to which 
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he had not referred in his testimony in chief, since the cross-
examination was directed primarily to matters implicit in de-
fendant's general denial, i.e., his purpose and motive, his gen-
eral plan and scheme. 
[13] Criminal Law-Jury-Instructions After Submission of Case. 
-Statements of trial judge and advice to jury, whose foreman 
expressed inability to agree on any count in an extortion 
case, to consider the case dispassionately, to put aside any ill 
feeling or animosity they may have, that he would not coun-
tenance physical violence among them, that they need not be 
in agreement as to all counts, and that it was their duty to 
deliberate until the court excused them could not be construed 
as showing that the verdicts of guilty were coerced, where 
the judge did not require the jury to prolong their delibera-
tions unduly in view of the fact that the trial had consumed 
44 days, and where he dealt properly with the suggested 
"bodily harm to one or more jurors." 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco and from an order denying 
a new trial. Eustace Cullinan, Jr., Judge. Affirmed in part 
and in part reversed and remanded for new trial. 
Prosecution for conspiracy to commit extortion and for 
extortion. Judgment of conviction affirmed as to one count 
charging extortion, and reversed and remanded for new trial 
as to other counts charging extortion and conspiracy to com-
mit extortion. 
Leo R. Friedman for Appellant. 
Charles R. Garry and George Olshausen as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Victor Griffith, Deputy At-
torney General, for Respondent. 
Thomas C. Lynch, District Attorney (San Francisco) as 
Amicus Curiae lln behalf of Respondent. 
THE COURT.-Defendants Tarantino and Eichenbaum 
were indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit extortion 
(Pen. Code, § 182) and three counts of extortion (Pen. Code, 
§ 518). Defendant Tarantino alone appeals from a judgment 
of conviction entered on a jury verdict of guilty on all four 
counts and from an order denying his motion for a new trial. 
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Tarantino (herein sometimes called defendant) published 
a weekly magazine and made weekly radio broadcasts. Nine 
witnesses testified that they had been "blasted" or threatened 
with "blasting" by defendant, but that he stopped his attacks 
and threats after they paid money to Eichenbaum, sponsored 
advertisements in defendant's magazine, and, in one case, 
agreed to sell the magazine to the public. Much of the evi-
dence against defendant consisted of recordings of conver-
sations in his hotel room introduced over objection that they 
had been obtained in violation of the provisions of the United 
States Constitution and the California Constitution against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. An inspector in the San 
Francisco Police Department testified that at the suggestion 
of the district attorney and the chief of inspectors he employed 
a sound engineer and had a locksmith make a key to defend-
ant's hotel room. In December, 1951, the engineer, acting 
under the direction of the inspector and using the key that 
the locksmith made, entered defendant's room and installed 
a microphone behind a small hole in the ceiling. Wires from 
the microphone were strung up the airshaft, across adjacent 
roofs, and into an apartment that the police and district 
attorney had rented in a nearby building. The inspector and 
the engineer testified that they acted without defendant's 
knowledge or permission. From December, 1951, until Feb-
ruary, 1953, the police listened to every sound that was made 
in defendant's room. They did not consider all of the conver-
sations they overheard relevant to the investigation, but re-
corded only those they considered "pertinent" and "inter-
esting.'' The recordings, totalling 198 reels of tape or 
approximately 500 hours of listening time, were edited by 
the district attorney and the police, arranged according to 
subject matter, and rerecorded in part on composite tapes. 
The district attorney introduced 60 selected excerpts in evi-
dence, and since they related to threats, promises, and 
demands for money, they constituted corroborative evidence 
of the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. 
Defendant contends that this evidence was obtained by un-
constitutional means (Irvine v. California (1954), 347 U.S. 
128, 132 [74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561] ; Wolf v. Colorado 
( 1949), 338 U.S. 25, 27 [ 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782]) 
and should therefore have been excluded (People v. Cahan 
(1955), 44 Cal.2d 434, 444 [282 P.2d 905]; People v. Berger 
( 1955), 44 Cal.2d 459, 462 [282 P.2d 509]). The district 
attorney contends, however, that section 653h of the Penal 
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Code permits the police to install and use a as 
was done in this case and that unless the section is uncon-
stitutional the recordings were not obtained in violation of 
the Constitutions. [1] Section 653h provides that "Any 
person who, without the consent of the ... occupant, installs 
or attempts to install or use a dictograph in any house, room, 
[or] apartment . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor; provided, 
that nothing herein shall prevent the use and installation 
of dictographs by a regular salaried peace officer expressly 
authorized thereto by the head of his office or department 
or by a district attorney, when such use and installation are 
necessary in the performance of their duties in detecting 
crime and in the apprehension of criminals." It was pointed 
out in People v. Cahan, sttpra, that this section "does not 
and could not authorize violations of the Constitution" and 
that the proviso under which the officers in that case and this 
case ''purported to act at most prevents their conduct from 
constituting a violation of that section itself." ( 44 Cal.2d 
at 437.) Since the statute does not purport to authorize 
any installations whatever, to interpret the proviso as author-
izing conduct that the Constitution prohibits would not only 
render it subject to attack on that ground (Irvine v. Cali-
fornia (1954), supra, 347 U.S. 128, 132), but read into it 
words that are not there. [2] Moreover, installations by 
police officers that violate the constitutional provisions cannot 
be made lawful by the authorization of the head of the police 
department or the district attorney. Those provisions protect 
the people from unreasonable invasions of their privacy by 
the police, and the determination of what is reasonable cannot 
be left to them. ''Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth 
Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen 
and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor 
to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was 
done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to 
invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right 
of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion 
of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest 
of criminals." (McDonald v. United States (1948), 335 
U.S. 451, 455 [69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153] ; see also United 
States v. Jeffers (1951), 342 U.S. 48, 51 [72 S.Ct. 93, 96 
hEd. 59]; Johnson v. United States (1948), 333 U.S. 10, 14 
[68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436]; United States v. Lefkowitz 
( 1932), 285 U.S. 452, 464 [52 S. Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877, 82 
A.L.R. 775]; Drayton v. United States (1953), 205 F.2d 
35, 37.) 
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that the secret of defendant's room 
of the microphone were done the engineer, 
a private person, and that a lawless search and sei.zure by a 
private person acting in a private capacity is not a violation 
by a state or federal agency of constitutional guaranties. 
(Burdeatl !JlcDoweU (1921), 256 U.S. 465, 475 [41 S.Ct. 
574, 65 L.Ed. 1048, 13 A.L.R. .) [4] The engineer. 
however, was employed by the district attorney and the police 
department He worked under the direct supervision of an 
inspector of police, and was paid with public funds. Accord-
ingly, his installation of the microphone as an agent of public 
officials and the clandestine eavesdropping by the police vio-
lated the constitutional provisions. (hvine v. California 
(1954), supra, 347 U.S. 128, 132; Wolf v. Colorado (1949), 
supra, 338 U.S. 25, 27.) Evidence so obtained must be ex-
cluded. (People v. Cahan (1955), supra, 44 Cal.2d 434, 444; 
People v. Bm·ger (1955), supra, 44 Cal.2d 459, 462.) 
The People contend, however, that the admission of the 
evidence did not result in a miscarriage of justice and that 
the judgment must therefore be affirmed. (Cal. Const., art. 
VI, § 4%.) In support of this contention it is urged that 
the verdicts were supported by the testimony of 21 witnesses, 
that several of these witnesses testified that defendant com-
mitted acts of extortion similar to those with which he was 
charged, and that one of tbe acts of extortion for which he 
was indicted, that charged in Count 2, occurred before the 
microphone was hidden in his room. As to Count 2 it appears 
to us that the evidence, entirely indepen(le:ut of that illegally 
obtained, convincingly, if not ovenvhelmingly, establishes 
guilt, and, for the reasons hereinafter more particularly 
stated, we conclude that the verdict on this count should 
not be disturbed. 
[5] As to Counts 1 (conspiracy of defendants Tarantino 
and Eichenbaum to commit extortion), 3 (extortion from 
Rourke), and 4 (extortion from Armstrong), the illegally 
obtained recordings contain evidence immediately and directly 
tending to prove the charged offenses. The 60 excerpts of 
illegally obtained recordings were played repeatedly to the 
court and jury. They contained the names of the complaining 
witnesses and defendant's recorded remarks connected these 
names, insofar as Connts 1, 3 and 4 are concerned, with 
threats and demands for money. Sinee the reeordings elearly 
constituted a substantial and important part of the evidence 
pertinent to the last mentioned counts, it cannot be said 
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that the verdicts as to those counts rested on evidence inde-
pendent of them. (See Stevens v. Snow (1923), 191 Cal. 
58, 67 [214 P. 968] .) Accordingly their admission in evidence 
deprived the defendant of a fair trial and resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice which necessitates a new trial as to 
such counts. 
[6] The circumstances of the commission of the offense 
against Paul Vlasoff, Count 2, as related in his testimony, 
are as follows: He had known Tarantino and Eichenbaum 
since 1950. In 1950 Eichenbaum came into the Club Con-
tinental, a bar opera ted by VIas off, and "told" Vlasoff to 
put an advertisement in Tarantino's magazine, Hollywood 
Life. Vlasoff said that he did not care to advertise his bar 
in Tarantino's magazine. Eichenbaum said, "You don't have 
to do that, just put a blood bank ad in there." Vlasoff agreed 
to place the advertisement and paid $25. 
In 1951 Vlasoff operated both the Club Continental and a 
card room. Eichenbaum came into the card room in July 
or August, 1951, and said that Tarantino was "awfully mad" 
at Vlasoff and was going to ''blast'' him on his radio program 
the next day. At Vlasoff's request Eichenbaum placed a 
telephone call to Tarantino and Vlasoff talked with him. 
Tarantino told Vlasoff that Vlasoff was ''getting away with 
murder, booking horses, and a crap game," and that Taran-
tino was going to "blast" him. Vlasoff said, "What can 
I do to make up? . . . I don't want you to blast me on the 
air tomorrow, otherwise I'll have to close up the place." 
'rarantino replied that Vlasoff should talk with Eichenbaum. 
Eichenbaum talked further with Tarantino on the telephone, 
then told Vlasoff that Tarantino would "forget the incident" 
for $500. Vlasoff protested against the amount. After fur-
ther negotiations they agreed upon a figure of $200. Also 
Eichenbaum told Vlasoff, "you will have to put an ad in 
there to keep him quiet." Vlasoff agreed to this. He paid 
the $200 and was billed for but did not pay for an advertise-
ment in Hollywood Life. 
As stated, the offense charged in Count 2 occurred, accord-
ing to the testimony of Vlasoff, in July or August, 1951. 
The listening and recording device by which evidence was 
illegally obtained was not installed until December, 1951. 
'fhere is no mention in the evidence obtained by the device 
of the alleged offense against Vlasoff. There is brief mention 
by Tarantino in one of his recorded conversations of "Paul" 
and "the Continental" but it is not in connection with any 
extortion. 
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Independently of the recordings, the effect of Vlasoff's 
testimony describing the commission of the offense against 
him is impressively strengthened by the testimony of other 
witnesses, the victims of Counts 3 and 4 and the victims of 
extortions not charged against the defendants, showing the 
pattern of defendant's criminal operations. This admissible 
evidence of other offenses is of such probative, corroborative 
effect that the record as a whole, notwithstanding its further 
content of illegally obtained evidence, falls short of leading 
us to the opinion that as to this count of the indictment 
(Count 2), defendant's conviction can be said to constitute 
a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 41;2.) 
[7] In this connection it is to be noted that the jury were 
instructed that "Each count set forth in the Indictment 
charges a separate and distinct offense. You must consider 
the evidence applicable to each alleged offense as though it 
were the only accusation before you for consideration, and 
you must state your finding as to each count in a separate 
verdict, uninfluenced by the mere fact that your verdict 
as to any other count or counts is in favor of, or against, the 
defendants. They may be convicted or acquitted upon any 
or all of the offenses charged, depending upon the evidence 
and the weight you give to it, under the Court's instructions." 
It is to be presumed that the jury obeyed this instruction 
and was not influenced to return a guilty verdict as to 
Count 2 upon evidence other than that pertinent to this count. 
(People v. Dabb (1948), 32 Cal.2d 491, 499 [197 P.2d 1] [it 
must be assumed that the jury followed instructions that 
evidence as to offenses of codefendants which was not con-
nected with defendant could not be considered against him] ; 
People v. Lamendola (1953), 119 Cal.App.2d 570, 572 [259 
P.2d 982] [it must be presumed that the jury followed in-
structions that they were to consider certain evidence solely 
for the purpose of impeachment] ; People v. Grimes (1952), 
113 Cal.App.2d 365, 371 [248 P.2d 130] ["It will be pre-
sumed that the jurors were true to their oaths and followed 
the various admonitions and instructions of the court,'' 
particularly with reference to evidence of prior similar of-
fenses]; People v. Martinez (1937), 19 Cal.App.2d 599, 604 
[66 P.2d 161] [it may be assumed that the jury followed 
the instruction that the extrajudicial statement of each de-
fendant could be considered only as to him and not as to his 
codefendants]; People v. Griffin (1935), 9 Cal.App.2d 246, 
249 [ 49 P.2d 321] [it must be assumed that jury heeded 
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the instruction that evidence defendant 
can be considered as that . ) 
In addition to the claim that the were inadmis-
sible because they were illegally obtained, defendant 
other contentions. [8] He urges that he was denied a 
reasonable opportunity to hear and the illegally 
obtained recordings before or after therefrom were 
received in evidence. The record shows that defense counsel 
were offered and did not avail themselves of opportunities 
to hear the recordings. [9] Defendant urges, further, that 
the court should have granted his requests for copies of tran-
scriptions, prepared by the prosecution, of those portions of 
the recordings which were not introduced in evidence. De-
fendant, whose conversations were the subject of the record-
ings and transcriptions, does not suggest what useful purpose 
would have been served by his counsel's hearing the record-
ings or reading the transcriptions: he does not suggest that 
they contained anything relevant to this case. 
[10] Defendant complains of the admission of evidence, 
some properly and some illegally obtained, which tends to 
show extortions and attempted extortions other than those 
charged. Such evidence is relevant to the Vlasoff extortion 
for it tends to show criminal methods and purposes similar 
to those shown by the testimony of Vlasoff. (See People v. 
Costa (1953), 40 Cal.2d 160. 167 [252 P.2d 1], and cases 
there cited.) Accordingly, such of it as was legally obtained 
was properly admitted; the portions of it which were un-
lawfully obtained were merely cumulative of the proof, which 
as hereinabove discussed, satisfactorily establishrs guilt on 
Count 2 independently of the evidence improperly admitted. 
[11] Defendant complains of the admission in evidence 
of approximately 200 issues of his magazine, Hollywood Life, 
which were found in his room at the time of his arrest. These 
magazines are clearly relevant and in themselves constitute 
overwhelming proof of certain of the elements in the case 
against defendant. He argues, however, that prejudice from 
the admission of this evidence appears from the facts that 
the magazines contained not only relevant material but also 
material not relevant to tl1e crimz•s charged and that the 
jury asked for and were allowed to have th:> magazines in 
the jury room during their deliberations. Defendant's orig-
inal objection to the introduction of this evidence was on 
the sole ground that the prosecution had not shown that 
defendant edited or wrote the material in HoUywood Life. 
The prosecution had shown, however, that defendant was its 
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defendant asked that the magazines 
be excluded from evidence and that only such por-
tions as were pertinent should be received in evidence. The 
magazines as a whole. and not merely selected portions thereof. 
were relevant since, as shown by other evidence, they were 
an instrumentality by which defendant carried out his threats 
to "blast" his victims and the victims, as Vlasoff testified, 
were "told" to advertise in the magazine. 
[12] Tarantino on direct examination testified in effect 
that he did not commit the extortions charged. The prose-
cution, over objection, cross-examined him as to other, similar 
offenses to which he had not referred in his testimony in 
chief. He contends that his cross-examination improperly 
went beyond "matters about which he was examined in 
chief" (Pen. Code, § 1323). The contention is without merit. 
Since Tarantino's testimony on direct examination amounted 
to a general denial of the truth of the charges against him, 
"the permissible scope of cross-examination is very wide." 
(People v. Zerrillo (1950), 36 Cal.2d 222,228 [223 P.2d 223].) 
'rhe cross-examination here was directed primarily to matters 
implicit in Tarantino's general denial, i.e., his purpose and 
motive, his general plan and scheme. 
[13] Defendant urges that the following circumstances 
show that the verdicts were coerced : The jury retired to 
deliberate on the morning of December 18 and the verdicts 
were returned on the evening of December 22. At 4 p. m. on 
December 19 the jury came into court after they had sent 
the judge a note signed by the foreman which stated, "We 
cannot agree on any count.'' The foreman told the judge 
that the division of the jury was nine to three. (At no time 
was it disclosed how many votes were for acquittal and 
how many for conviction.) 
At 10 :40 a. m. on December 21 the foreman gave the judge 
a note which stated that the jury "stand 11 to 1, and no 
ehance of a change''; another juror had written, ''Any 
further argument is very likely to result in bodily harm to 
one or more jurors." The judge instructed the jury at some 
length to eonsider the case dispassionately, and said, "I 
might just say, and this is not a threat, that if any juror 
inflicts any bodily harm on any other juror, I certainly 
would take care of that situation and deal with it in a manner 
that would make the offender very sorry that the incident 
occurred, if it does occur. Now, that is not a threat; that is 
just a rather blunt statement. but I beg all of you to put 
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aside any ill feeling that you might have, if you have any .... 
You are not partisans or advocates but judges. Now, if-
don't let any feeling of pride or feeling of personal hurt 
or animosity prevent you from discussing this case with calm-
ness and with equanimity." 
On December 22 the judge received three notes. One, 
written by the foreman on the night of December 21, stated, 
''deliberation is proceeding in a friendly atmosphere. We 
are determined to continue in this manner whether we even-
tually reach a verdict or not." A note from a juror, marked 
3 :35 p. m., December 22, stated, ''The opposed juror states 
he is withholding information from us until tomorrow morn-
ing. He states he is protecting three interests, the State, 
the defense and the jury." And another note from the fore-
man, also marked 3:35 p.m., December 22, stated, "We are 
not deliberating now and have not been deliberating during 
many long periods of time previous to this. . . . It is the 
opinion of everyone that we cannot do any more." 
At 4 :30 p. m. the judge called the jury into the courtroom 
and said, "Now, it is your duty, under your oaths as jurors, 
to deliberate, and to refuse to discuss the case further is 
a violation of your oaths as jurors. I know that you have 
been very patient and have been here a long time, and maybe 
tempers wear thin, but it is your duty to deliberate until 
the court excuses you.'' The judge pointed out that the 
jury need not be in agreement as to all counts and asked 
them to deliberate ''somewhat further.'' At 8 :45 p. m. they 
returned with the verdicts. 
There was nothing in the statements of the trial judge, 
representative portions of which are quoted above, which 
suggested an opinion as to what verdicts should be reached, 
nor was there any improper pressure upon the jury to agree. 
( Cf. People v. Walker (1949), 93 Cal.App.2d 818, 821-825 
[209 P.2d 834], and cases there cited and summarized; People 
v. Crowley (1950), 101 Cal.App.2d 71,75-78 [224 P.2d 748].) 
It does not appear that the judge required the jury to pro-
long their deliberations unduly, particularly in view of the 
fact that the trial had consumed 44 days. The judge dealt 
properly with the suggested "bodily harm to one or more 
jurors.'' We conclude that the record does not support de-
fendant's claim that the verdicts were coerced. 
Other arguments of defendant do not relate to matters 
which could have had a prejudicial effect as to the conviction 
upon Count 2 and need not be specifically discussed. 
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The judgment and order on Count 2 are affirmed; on 
Counts 1, 3 and 4 the and order are reversed and 
the cause is remanded for a new trial. 
SPENCE, J.-1 concur. 
'rhe majority opinion reverses as to counts 1, 3, and 4 
upon the authority of People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 
P.2d 905], and People v. Berger, 44 Cal.2d 459 [282 P.2d 
:J09]. I dissented in those cases and my views remain un-
ehanged concerning the undesirability there of departing from 
the previously established nonexclusionary rule. Nevertheless. 
the majority there decided that the earlier cases should be 
overruled, and that the exclusionary rule should be adopted. 
Since the decision of the cited cases, the exclusionary rule 
has become the rule in this state governing the admissibility 
of evidence; and the trial courts have been required to 
accept and apply it. I have reluctantly determined that I 
should now yield to the views of the majority and accept the 
exclusionary rule as the established rule. 
The reasons for my determination may be briefly stated. 
'l'he exclusionary rule, as established by the Cahan and Berger 
decisions, is admittedly merely ''a rule of evidence.'' (People 
v. Cahan, S1tpra, p. 450.) Concerning the desirability of 
adopting the exclusionary rule, there has been sharp dis-
agreement throughout the years among the best legal minds. 
It being merely a rule of evidence, I believe that the para-
mount consideration now, in the interest of the orderly 
administration of justice in this state, is that there be a 
firmly established rule which will not be subject to change 
from time to time with the possible change in the views of 
a single member of this court. My vie1YS respecting the de-
sirability of adhering to an established rule constituted one 
of the reasons for my dissent in the Cahan and Berger cases. 
In the situation now confronting me, that same reason would 
seem to indicate that I should accept the rule established 
by the majority opinions in those cases. 
Furthermore, it is clear from the opinion in the Cahan 
case, that this court still has before it the difficult task of 
adopting "workable rules" to supplement the general exclu-
sionary rule. (People v. Cahan, supra, p. 451.) Numerous 
cases are now pending here involving the determination of 
such workable rules. Other pending cases, like the present 
one, call for a determination of the question of whether 
the admission of evidence, which should have been excluded 
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under the exclusionary rule, has resulted in a miscarriage 
of justice. ( Const., art. VI, § 4%.) It appears desirable 
that all members of this court should participate in the 
determination of the numerous questions presented by the 
pending cases, and it further appears that full participation 
by any member of this court in the determination of many 
of these important questions will be possible only if such 
member is willing to accept the exclusionary rule as the 
established rule. If perchance, either the exclusionary rule 
itself, or any other rule that this court may adopt to supple-
ment it, should prove unsatisfactory, it is within the province 
of the Legislature to deal with this important evidentiary 
problem in such manner as it may deem appropriate. 
Edmonds, J ., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
I would reverse the judgment and order on all counts. 
Defendants were convicted of four crimes alleged to be part 
of an extensive criminal venture whereby Tarantino used 
threats of exposure by magazine and radio to extort money 
from his victims. Since the victims were of unsavory char-
acter, to convince the jury, it was necessary for the prosecu-
tion to substantiate its case by evidence that the victims were 
telling the truth. It accomplished this purpose by intro-
ducing 60 excerpts of illegally obtained recordings of con-
versations that took place in Tarantino's room. These 
recordings permeated the prosecution's case, and the record 
demonstrates that they weighed heavily with the jury in 
substantiating the testimony of the victims. After the jury 
had been out for over a day, the jurors reported that they 
could not agree on any count of the indictment. Thereafter 
excerpts of the recordings were repeatedly played to them at 
their request, and not until after four days of deliberation 
were they able to reach a verdict. 
The majority opinion concedes that under these circum-
stances the admission of the illegally obtained evidence was 
prejudicial as to three of the counts. It concludes, how-
ever, that as to Count 2, no prejudice is shown. It reaches 
1his conclusion on the following grounds: (1) The alleged 
Vlasoff extortion occurred before the microphone was hidden 
in Tarantino's room, and there ''is no mention in the evi-
dence obtained by the device of the alleged offense against 
Vlaso:ff." (2} Vlasoff's testimony is "impressively strength-
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cued of other the victims of Counts 
3 and 4 and the victims of extortions not charged against the 
defendants, showing the pattern of defendant's criminal 
operations." ( 3) The jury was instructed that "Each count 
set forth in the Indictment charges a separate and distinct 
offense. You must consider the evidence applicable to each 
alleged offense as though it were the only accusation before 
you for consideration, and you must state your finding as 
to each count in a separate verdict; uninfluenced by the mere 
fact that your verdict as to any other count or counts is in 
favor of, or against, the defendants. They may be convicted 
or acquitted upon any or all of the offenses charged, depend-
ing upon the evidence and the weight you give to it, under 
the Court's instruction." (4) "It is to be presumed that the 
jury obeyed this instruction and was not influenced to return 
a guilty verdict as to Count 2 upon evidence other than that 
pertinent to this count." When these grounds are viewed in 
the light of the record they demonstrate that the admission 
of the illegally obtained evidence was just as prejudicial with 
respect to the \TJ.asoff count as it was with respect to the 
others. 
Vlasoff testified that during the pendency of the present 
proceedings he had been indicted for attempting to steal 
money by means of fraudulent and marked cards and loaded 
dice, that he had been a pimp living off the earnings of prosti-
tutes, and that he had been arrested at different times for 
vagrancy, pimping, gambling, and after-hours sales of liquor. 
He also admitted committing perjury for $1,000 by signing a 
false affidavit. Had his testimony stood alone, it is doubtful 
that it would have convinced the jury of defendants' guilt on 
Count 2. \Vhat other evidence would the jury consider '' perti-
nent to this count"~ It would consider the same evidence 
that the majority opinion considers relevant to sustain the 
conviction on Count 2, namely, the evidence ''showing the 
pattern of defendant's criminal operations," evidence that, 
with respect to crimes not charged, was only admissible be-
cause it was relevant as showing ''criminal methods and pur-
poses similar to those shown by the testimony of Vlasoff.'' 
Inextricably intermixed with the admissible relevant evidence 
of other crimes was the inadmissible evidence of those crimes 
provided by the recordings. The jury could not rationally 
determine whether the testimony of the other victims "im-
:pressively strengthened" Vlasoff's testimony until it deter-
mined whether those victims were telling the truth, and it 
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would inevitably turn to the recordings in that de-
termination. 
The judgment in this case must stand or fall as a whole. 
Since all of the offenses charged were part of one pattern of 
alleged criminal conduct, evidence of each offense was relevant 
to prove all of the others. The indictment itself listed de-
fendants' conversations with Vlasoff as overt acts of the 
conspiracy charged in Count 1. In reaching its verdict on 
Count 2 the jury was not required so to compartmentalize 
the evidence as to disregard the evidence on the other counts, 
for the evidence on the other counts, including the illegally 
obtained evidence, was not only relevant but ''pertinent'' 
to Count 2, and indeed, the majority opinion itself relies on 
the legally obtained evidence on the other counts to affirm 
the conviction on Count 2. Since the jury was instructed to 
consider all of the relevant evidence, it cannot be assumed 
that in reaching its verdict on Count 2 it relied solely on the 
legally obtained evidence on the other counts to substantiate 
Vlasoff's testimony and disregarded the illegally obtained 
evidence on those counts. Nor can it be assumed that it relied 
on both classes of evidence in reaching its verdict on Counts 
1, 3, and 4 but only on legally obtained evidence in reaching 
its verdict on Count 2. The conclusion is inescapable that 
if the admission of the illegally obtained evidence was prej-
udicial as to Counts 1, 3, and 4, it was also prejudicial as 
to Count 2. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I am in full accord with the views expressed by Mr. 
Justice Traynor in his dissenting opinion, and I do not 
believe it is possible for anyone to say with any degree of 
sincerity or conviction that the conceded error in the ad-
mission of material evidence unlawfully obtained does not 
permeate the entire record and equally affect the determina-
tion of the jury as to Count 2 as well as to the other counts. 
This must be apparent when we consider the effect of the 
instruction given by the court to the jury relative to the 
evidence offered of other similar offenses which the prose-
cution claims the defendant bad committed.* In view of 
*''Evidence was offered in this case for the purpose of showing that 
the defendants committed other crimes than the ones of which they are 
accused, and for which they are on trial in this action. Such evidence 
was received for a limited purpose only, not to prove distinct offenses 
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this instruction it must be assumed that the jury considered 
all of the illegally obtained evidence for whatever bearing 
''it might nave on the question of whether defendants are 
innocent M guilty of any crime charged against them in this 
action'' anJ if such illegally obtained evidence tended to 
show that dt-fendant had a motive for the offense charged 
against him 1n Count 2, or that he entertained the intent 
which is a n-ecessary element of said offense, or that he 
possessed kno;vledge that might have been useful in the 
commission of &'lid offense, or that there existed in his mind 
a plan, scheme, system or design which fitted into the com-
mission of said vffense, or that there existed in his mind a 
consciousness of guilt, it would be relied upon to establish 
his guilt of the ort'.-mse charged in Count 2. Certainly it cannot 
be said that the tremendous volume of illegally obtained 
evidence which was offered by the prosecution in this case 
did not tend to establish some or all of the above mentioned 
elements of the offense charged in Count 2, and therefore 
I think it is only fair to assume that the illegally obtained 
evidence admitted o¥er the objection of defendant weighed 
heavily with the jmy in determining the guilt of the de-
fendant Tarantino of the crime charged in Count 2. In 
view of this clear an•J obvious situation I do not think it 
can fairly be said that the admission of this evidence did not 
result in a miscarriage <lf justice as to Count 2 but did result 
in a miscarriage of just.ice as to Counts 1, 3 and 4. 
Without considering the effect of the above quoted in-
struction relating to the .lpplicability of the illegally obtained 
evidence to Count 2, the majority opinion states : ''The sixty 
excerpts of illegally obtained recordings were played re-
or continued criminality, but for such bearing, if any, as it might have 
on the question whether defei.tdants are innocent or guilty of any crime 
charged against them in this nction. 
"You are not permitted to consider that evidence for any other pur-
pose, and as to that purpose, you must weigh such evidence as you 
do all other in the case. You are not permitted to consider that evidence 
for any other purpose. The value, if any, of such evidence, depends on 
whether it tends to show, first, that the defendants had a motive for 
the commission of the offense charged against them in this action, or. 
second, that the defendants entertained the intent which is a necessary 
element of the alleged crime fo1 which they are now on trial, as pointed 
out in these instructions, or, third. that the defendants possessed knowl 
edge that might have been useful in the commission of any crime for 
which they are now on trinl; o~, fourth, that there existed in the mind~ 
of the defendants a plnn, sclwme, system or design, into which fitted 
the commission of the offense for which they are now on trial; or, fifth. 
that there existed in the minds of the defendants a consciousness of 
guilt." 
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peatedly to the court and jury. They contained the names 
of the complaining witnesses and defendant's recorded re-
marks connected these names, insofar as Counts 1, 3 and 4 
are concerned, with threats and demands for money. Since 
the recordings clearly constituted a substantial and important 
part of the evidence pertinent to the last mentioned counts, 
it cannot be said that the verdicts as to those counts rested 
on evidence independent of them. (See Stevens v. Snow 
(1923), 191 Cal. 58, 67 [214 P. 968].) Accordingly their 
admission in evi,lence the defendant of a fair trial 
and resulted in a miscarriage of justice which necessitates 
a new trial as to such counts.'' As justification for its holding 
that the admission of the illegally obtained evidence deprived 
the defendant of a fair trial and resulted in a miscarriage 
of justice which necessitates a new trial as to Counts 1, 3 
and 4, but not as to Count 2, the majority opinion states: 
"Independently of the recordings, the effect of Vlasoff 's 
testimony describing the commission of the offense against 
him is impressively strengthened by the testimony of other 
witnesses, the victims of Counts 3 and 4 and the victims of 
extortions not charged against the defendants, showing the 
pattern of defendant's criminal operations. This admissible 
evidence of other offenses is of such probative, corroborative 
effect that the record as a whole, notwithstanding its further 
content of illegally obtained evidcnee, falls short of leading 
us to the opinion that as to this count of the indictment 
(Count 2), defendant's conviction can be said to constitute 
a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%.)" The 
majority opinion then discusses the effect of the instructions 
given by the court to the jury with respect to the weighing 
of the evidence as to each count in the indictment and the 
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence as to each 
count independent of the other, and concludes that it must 
be presumed that the jury followed these instructions. But 
the majority makes no mention of the instruction hereinabove 
quoted and the effect such instruction might have in causing 
the jury to give consideration to the illegally obtained evi-
dence in arriving at their verdict as to Count 2. I am disposed 
to agree with the majority that it must be presumed that 
the jury followed the instructions of the court, but in so 
doing they would be required to give consideration to much 
if not all of the illegally obtained evidence in their determina-
tion of the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the offense 
charged in Count 2, and therefore if, as the majority hold, 
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fair trial and resulted in a miscarriage of justice as to 
Counts 1, 3 and 4, it is inescapable that a fair and honest 
consideration of the record points unerringly to the same 
conclusion as to Count 2. 
Since the majority here invokes section 4% of article VI 
of the Constitution of California as the basis for its holding 
that the judgment as to Count 2 should be affirmed, I think 
it might be well to give consideration to the applicability 
of this provision to the case at bar. In my opinion section 
4% of article VI of the Constitution of California postulates 
a wise and salutary coneept of appellate review in both 
eriminal and eivil cases. Its adoption marked a departure 
from the rigid application of teehnical rules which had been 
previously invoked by this court and which had resulted in 
the reversal of judgments in eriminal cases where there was 
seareely any doubt as to the guilt of the defendant and it 
was obvious that form rather than substance was playing 
too dominant a role in the decisions of our courts. Hence the 
people saw fit in the adoption of this provision to write into 
the Constitution the concept that a reviewing court should 
not reverse a judgment because of a mere teehnical error 
which did not go to the merits of the case or could not pos-
sibly affect the result and thereby enjoined upon the re-
viewing court the duty to examine the entire record and 
determine therefrom whether or not the error complained 
of had resulted in a miscarriage of justice before ordering 
a reversal of the judgment. 'l'his amendment was adopted 
about the time that I began the practice of law, and I believed 
at the time of its adoption and still believe that it constituted 
a major salutary step in the administration of justice in 
this state. While this constitutional provision has not been 
applied with uniformity by our courts, I think the best 
reasoned cases have uniformly held that it cannot be invoked 
to cure an error which affeets the substantial rights of the 
litigant, or, in other words, an error which might affect the 
•letermination of a material issue in a case. As early as 
1913 this court speaking through Mr. Justice Sloss in the case 
of People v. O'Bryan, 165 Cal. 55, at pages 65-66 [130 P. 1042], 
made the following illuminating observations with reference 
to the application of this section to the review of a judgment 
of conviction in a criminal case: "This much, however, we 
think may be safely said. Section 41/ 2 of article VI of our 
constitution must be given at !0ast the effect of abrogating 
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the old rule that is from any error of 
law. Where error is shown it is the duty of the court to 
examine the evidence and ascertain from such examination 
whether the error did or did not in fact work any injury. 
'l'he mere fact of error does not make out a prima facie case 
for reversal which must be overcome by a clear showing that 
no injury could have resulted. 
''On the other hand, we do not understand that the amend-
ment in question was designed to repeal or abrogate the 
guaranties accorded persons accused of crime by other parts 
of the same constitution or to overthrow all statutory rules 
of procedure and evidence in criminal cases. ·when we speak 
of administering 'justice' in criminal cases, under the Eng-
lish or American system of procedure, we mean something 
more than merely ascertaining whether an accused is or is 
not guilty. It is an essential part of justice that the question 
of guilt or innocence shall be determined by an orderly legal 
procedure, in which the substantial rights belonging to de-
fendants shall be respected. For example, if a court should 
undertake to deny to a defendant charged with a felony the 
right of trial by jury, and after a hearing of the evidence 
render a judgment of conviction, it cannot be doubted that 
such judgment should be set aside even though there had 
been the clearest proof of guilt. Or, if a defendant, after 
having been once acquitted, should be again brought to trial 
and thereupon convicted, in disregard of his plea that he 
had been once in jeopardy, it would hardly be suggested 
that because he was in fact guilty, no 'miscarriage of justice' 
had occurred.'' 
In People v. Sarazzawski, 27 Cal.2d 7, 11 [161 P.2d 934], 
decided in 1945, this court d0clared: "When a defendant 
has been denied any essential element of a fair trial or due 
process, even the broad saving provisions of section 41/z of 
article VI of our state Constitution cannot remedy the vice 
and the judgment cannot stand. (People v. Mahoney, 201 
Cal. 618. 627 [258 P. 607) ; People v. Adams, 76 Cal.App. 
178, 186-187 [244 P. 106]; People v. Gilliland, 39 Cal.App.2d 
250, 264 [103 P.2d 179]; People v. Duvernay, 43 Cal.App.2d 
823, 829 [ 111 P .2d 659].) That section was not designed to 
'abrogate the guaranties accorded persons accused of crimP 
by other parts of the same constitution or to overthrow all 
statutory rules of procedure and evidence in criminal cases. 
When we speak of administering "justice" in criminal 
cases, under the English or Ameriran system of procedure, 
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we mean more than ascertaining whether 
an accused is or is not guilty. It is an essential part of justice 
that the question of guilt or innocence shall be determined 
by an orderly legal procedure, in which the substantial rights 
belonging to defendants shall be respected.' (People v. 
O'Bryan, 165 CaL 55, 65 [130 P. 1042], opinion of Mr. Justice 
Sloss; People v. Wilson, 23 Cal.App. 513, 524 [138 P. 971] .) " 
In People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 458 [249 P. 859], Mr. 
Justice Shenk, speaking for a unanimous court, said : ''The 
amendment by which said section 47'2 >vas added to the con-
stitution was not 'designed to repeal or abrogate the guaran-
ties accorded persons accused of crime by other parts of 
the same constitution, &r to overthrow all statutory rules of 
procedure and evidence in criminal cases.' (People v. O'Bryan, 
165 Cal. 55 [130 P. 1042] ; People v. Frey, 165 Cal. 140 [131 
P. 127]; People v. Wilson, 23 Cal.App. 513 [138 P. 971]; 
People v. Ho Kim You, 24 Cal.App. 451 [141 P. 950].)" 
(Emphasis added.) 
In People v. Carmichael, 198 Cal. 534, 547 [246 P. 62], 
Mr. Justice Curtis speaking for this court, said: "No au-
thority has been called to our attention which can be construed 
as holding that section 4% of article VI of the constitution 
can be relied upon to sustain the judgment herein. As we 
have already said, in our opinion it was prejudicial error 
for the court to refuse the appellant the right to examine 
the jurors as to the effect on their minds of the standing of 
the former jury. The ruling of the court in thus limiting 
the appellant in his examination of the jurors was, in our 
opinion, the deprival of the appellant of a fundamental right, 
-a right to be tried by an impartial jury. It was never 
intended by this provision of the constitution to take from 
the defendant in a criminal action his fundamental right to 
a jury trial or in any substantial manner to abridge this right 
(People v. Wismer, 58 Cal.App. 679, 688 [209 P. 259] )." 
In People v. Bomar, 73 Cal.App. 372, 378 [238 P. 758], 
the court said: "Neither do we think that section 4% of 
article VI of the constitution is applicable in the present case. 
Before any accused person can be called upon to defend 
himself on any charge prosecuted by information, he is en-
titled to a preliminary examination upon said charge, and 
the judgment of the magistrate before whom such examination 
is held as to whether the crime for which it is sought to 
prosecute him has been committed, and whether there is suffi-
411 C.2d-20 
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cient cause to believe him guilty thereof. These proceedings 
are essential to confer jurisdiction upon the court before 
whom he is placed on trial. To say that he was accorded a 
fair trial upon an information filed against him without a 
substantial compliance with these jurisdictional requirements, 
and, therefore, that there had been no miscarriage of justice, 
hardly meets the situation. Such an argument would apply 
with equal force to the validity of the conviction upon an 
information filed by the district attorney in a case where 
no preliminary examination at all had been held. Such prac-
tice would result, in legal effect, in ;viping out all provisions 
of the constitution and the Penal Code providing for pre-
liminary examination, and in clothing the district attorney 
with unlimited authority to file information against whom-
soever in his judgment he might consider guilty of crime. 
\Ve do not believe that it was ever the intention to extend 
the scope of section 4% of article VI of the constitution to 
any such limits.'' 
In People v. Salaz, 66 Cal.App. 173, 185 [225 P. 777], the 
court said: ''While it is true that section 4% of article VI 
of the constitution confers upon this court the power to 
weigh, to a limited extent, the entire evidence upon which 
a conviction was had. still 'we are not substituted for the 
jury. We are not to determine, as an original inquiry, the 
question of defendant's guilt or innocence.' We are to 'decide 
whether, in our judgment, any error committed has led to 
the verdict which was reached.' (People v. O'Bryan, 165 
Cal. 55 [130 P. 1042].) (Italics ours.) And whenever we are 
unab7e to determine whether the defendant would have been 
convicted had erroneously admitted testimony been withheld 
from the .i~try's consideration, this sect1:on of the constitution 
cannot be applied to uphold the judgment. (People v. Mac-
Phee, 26 Cal.App. 218 [146 P. 522]. See, also, People v. 
Columbus, 49 Cal.App. 763 [194 P. 2881, Freeman v. Adams, 
63 Cal.App. 225 [218 P. 600], and People v. Roe, 189 Cal. 548 
[ 209 P. 560].) After a most careful consideration of the 
entire cause, including the evidence, we are unable to deter-
mine whether the jury would or would not have convicted 
appellant had Dr. \Vaguer's opinion as to the position of 
the parties been withheld from them. This being so, we do 
not think that the judgment can be upheld by reason of this 
provision of the constitution." (Emphasis added.) 
In People v. Abbott, 132 Cal.App. 109. 114 [22 P.2d !'5661, 
the court said: "Appellant, ho\YC\cr, argues that even if 
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this be true, section of article VI of the Constitution should 
rescue the case from the fate of a new trial. 1V e do not 
think this const·itutional section pennits us to consider the 
cm'dence of the whole case as a trial tTibunal and sustain or 
reverse evm·y judgment that reaches ~ts upon our own 'ver-
dict.' It does not intend to repeal the fundamental rights 
of trial by judge and jury where witnesses appear and their 
testimony may be given such weight as their words, conduct 
and appearance would seem to justify. There is certainly 
great doubt that the jury disregarded the court and found 
defendant guilty of one of the offenses excluded by the terms 
of the court's instructions. It is almost certain it did not. The 
defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all offenses charged 
against him before being punished for them and we should 
not take the chance of depriving him of such right upon 
unreasonable and strained constructions and presumptions.'' 
(Emphasis added.) 
The foregoing review of the authorities in this state relat-
ing to the application of section 41/z, article VI, of the Con-
stitution makes it crystal clear that an error such as the one 
here under review cannot be cured by the application of this 
section. 
·while a majority of this court has recently invoked this 
section for the purpose of affirming a judgment in a case 
where the appealing party had been denied the right to a 
peremptory challenge of a juror, its decision is clearly con-
trary to all the authorities (see my dissenting opinion in 
Buckley v. Chadwick filed November 8, 1955, ante, p. 183 
at p. 208 [288 P.2d 12]), and it is obvious that this pro-
vision was only relied on in that case as some slight justifica-
tion for the conclusion reached by the majority. In other 
words the majority desired to affirm the judgment and section 
4% of article VI was invoked even though the error there 
committed may have deprived the appellant of his right to 
a fair and impartial jury. No other case has gone this far or 
even approached it. The effect of such a decision is to permit 
the majority to resort to section 4% of article VI as a device 
which may be used for the affirmance of any judgment regard-
less of the seriousness of the error committed. In my opinion 
this is the situation which exists in the case at bar. To state 
the matter pointedly, it simply amounts to this: A majority 
of this court desire'; to affirm ;}u' judgment in this case, and 
section 4l!z of article VI of the Constitution is relied upon 
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to cure any error which may have occurred so far as Count 2 
is concerned. 
I also agree with appellant that it was prejudicial error 
to admit in evidence some 200 weekly issues of Hollywood 
Life, a magazine published by defendant, and to permit these 
magazines to be examined by the jury during their delibera-
tions. While these issues may have contained material evi-
dence in support of the charges against the defendant, they 
also contained many articles which had no bearing whatsoever 
upon any of the offenses charged, but may have had the effect 
of prejudicing the jury against the defendant. These issues 
contained many articles attacking members of the police 
department of San Francisco including high officials in said 
department. They also contained many articles attacking 
officials and employees of one of the most powerful newspaper 
syndicates in California. They also contained articles at-
tacking many public officials of San Francisco and California 
including the present attorney general. None of these articles 
had any bearing whatsoever upon any of the offenses charged 
against the defendant. It was therefore error of the most 
prejudicial character to admit in evidence the complete issues 
of these magazines and permit the jury to peruse the same. 
Defendant may be an undesirable character. His con-
duct as disclosed by the record is such that it could not help 
but create resentment, animosity and ill will on behalf of 
many prominent, influential people. His attacks upon most 
if not all of these people appear to be wholly unjustified and 
deserving of condemnation, but the problem before this court 
in reviewing his conviction of the offenses charged is to de-
termine whether or not he was accorded that fair and impartial 
trial guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of this state. 
Even a wicked, disreputable scandalmonger is entitled to a 
fair trial before he is convicted and punished. In my opinion 
the admission of the illegally obtained evidence and the issues 
of the Hollywood Life magazine constituted error of such 
magnitude that a fair and impartial trial was not had. Had 
this evidence been excluded it is not beyond the realm of 
probability that a different result may have been reached by 
the jury. The jury deliberated for five days before arriving 
at its verdict. This fact makes it obvious that at least some 
of the jurors were not convinced as to the guilt of the de-
fendant on all of the counts, and it may be that Count 2 was 
the one regarding which the doubt existed. In this state of 
the record I am convinced that the only solution which can 
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be reached this court which will be consonant with the 
quality of justice which should be administered by a court of 
justice, is that the judgment as to all counts should be 
reversed and the defendant should be granted a new trial. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
1955. C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 23728. In Bank. Nov. 29, 1955.] 
THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. ONE 1948 CHEVROLET 
CONVER'l'IBLE COUPE, ENGINE NO. FAA 433685, 
Defendant; BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST 
AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (a National Banking 
Association), Respondent. 
(1] Poisons-Forfeiture of Vehicle-Evidence.-In a proceeding 
to forfeit an automobile used in transporting marijuana, testi-
mony of a police officer that while four occupants were getting 
from the vehicle to the sidewalk one of them dropped a can 
containing marijuana into the bushes established by competent 
evidence, independently of any extrajudicial statements, that 
a narcotic had in fact been in the vehicle. 
[2] !d.-Forfeiture of Yehicle-Forfeiture of Lien Interests.-
Though the legal owner of an automobile seized for trans-
porting marijuana did not make the investigation of the pur-
chaser's character and moral responsibility required by Health 
& Saf. Code, § 11620, its interest is not subject to forfeiture 
in the absence of a proper forfeiture of the registered owner's 
interest, and despite the fact that she defaulted, the legal 
owner may protect its own interest by asserting any defense 
she may have had. 
[3] !d.-Forfeiture of Vehicle-Knowledge of Illegal Use.-In 
order that a vehicle may be forfeited for illegal transportation 
of narcotics, it is not necessary that the registered owner know 
of the illegal use, since such use of property is so undesirable 
that the owner surrenders his control at his peril. 
[4] !d.-Forfeiture of Vehicle-Purpose of Statute.-The purpose 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, §50 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6, 11] Poisons, § 17(5); [2, 7, 8] 
Poisons, § 17 ( 4); [3, 4, 9] Poisons, § 17 (2); [5, 10] Poisons, 
§ 1'7(3); [12, 13] Evidence, § 263. 
